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ABSTRACT

The key element in negotiation is power. This case study shows how one conservative group (ONE, the Organization of the Northeast, a Chicago community group) used "radical rhetoric" to achieve functional power in negotiations for community improvements. "Radical rhetoric" employs the tactics and the strategies used by protestors and demonstrators in the late 1960s and early 1970s to effect social change. The strategy of "radical rhetoric" is to make division obvious, to limit the choices of the existing decision-making structure, and to allow the group to become an influential part of the decision-making structure. (RL)

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O.N.E.: A Case Study in Argumentation and Negotiation

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O.N.E.: A Case Study in
Argumentation and Negotiation

Since the protests, actions and demonstrations of the late 60's and early 70's, we have read and written a great deal about radical groups, radical goals, radical protests--radical rhetoric, in general. Now in the later 70's, the trend in public phenomena seems to be back toward the right--toward conservative values, goals, and standards of behavior. But the legacy of the past is still with us. Tactics and strategies developed by radical protesters are now being utilized by "the silent majority" in their quest for traditional goals such as participatory democracy, equal rights, self-determination, and human respect.

Conservative groups are those within the mainstream of society seeking these traditional goals. They frequently find that to be heard they must present themselves as a group possessing enough power to significantly influence the course of a negotiation. To demonstrate that power, they are borrowing some of the radical rhetoric of the 60's.

The key element in negotiation is power. To illustrate the importance of the dimension of power in an argumentative transaction, I plan to examine initial efforts by one conservative community group to establish functional power in the decision-making structure of its community. This examination will demonstrate how a conservative group resorts to radical rhetoric to achieve power parity in negotiation.

Power

Robert Scott defined power simply as "the ability to satisfy one's wants--psychological, social, economic, or political." 1 In a mixed-motive interaction such as negotiation, power is measured not only by negotiators' abilities to satisfy their own wants, but also by the extent to which their abilities are essential to their opponents. This suggests power is functional rather than inherent. If A can increase the consequences of non-compliance for B, A's power over B grows. Non-compliance with A's demands carries a greater risk than compliance. B compares his reward-cost outcome for compliance with that for non-compliance. The greater the cost of non-compliance, the greater is A's power over B. B also has power over A--some resources or abilities A needs to fully accomplish goals. Therefore, A takes a risk by trying to raise the cost of non-compliance for B. According to John C. Harsanyi, "A realistic quantitative description of A's power over B must include, as an essential dimension of the power relation, the costs to A of attempting to influence B's behavior."[2] At some point, B may refuse to negotiate and take the resources A needs elsewhere. Regardless of the outcome of the negotiation with B, A may also be risking a reputation with a larger audience (consumers, prospective employees/ employers, regulatory agencies, etc.) if they perceive A's demands of B as unreasonable.

Therefore, power is limited by potential costs. In other words, power inevitably is shared in a negotiation. If one participant had all the power, there would be no reason to negotiate with the powerless opponent. A move toward negotiation is an implicit recognition of similar levels of power. The process of argumentation in negotiation, then, is a continuing attempt to alter the levels of power in one's own favor.

Such a situation points out the significance of perception of power. The level of power a negotiator attributes to an opponent is the level that influences the position taken in negotiation. Whether or not a negotiator can actually carry out a threat, if an

opponent believes the threat can be carried out, the negotiator operates with the power to do so. Conversely, if an opponent does not believe a threat can be carried out, then it is that perception of lack of power which influences the progress of the negotiation. Again, power in negotiation is not inherent, it is functional and perceptual.

Radical Voice in Conservative Rhetoric[3]

Scott's article, "The Conservative Voice in Radical Rhetoric," attempted to analyze rhetoric flowing from a strong sense of division. He identifies a pattern: "People experience division as oppression, seek fresh identifications, find dominant groups hypocritical, and, in responding to hypocrisy, sound a conservative voice."[4]

I contend that this pattern holds true, not just for radical groups, but with a reversal in the last step of the progression, for conservative groups sounding a radical voice.

The division between radical groups and the establishment is fairly obvious and has been considered in numerous articles[5]. Radical groups experience division because society at large perceives them as so different that their ideas are immaterial. The experience of conservative groups is similar except the division they feel is caused when society discounts their ideas because it does not perceive them to be different at all. "Establishment" groups (local and state government, powerful institutions, established organizations, etc.) assume a consubstantiality with all groups within the system. They acknowledge that they derive their power from the less powerful who have elected them, supported them, or in some way at least accepted their legitimacy as decision-makers. The lesser groups therefore are part of the decision-making structure. Their goal of participation presumably already is achieved.

But if a group within the structure desires a specific goal not anticipated by the larger group, frequently it begins to experience division--not consubstantiality--with the decision-makers. The constituent group finds itself without power and without conferred

legitimacy. It begins to perceive the vast power of the legitimized decision-makers and to realize it has almost no access to the decision-making structure. Because the system operates on the assumption that in a democracy all already have participated in decision-making and implicitly continue to do so, the new group must utilize agrumentative strategies to prove that assumption false under the existing circumstances. Then strategies are needed to change these circumstances.

Up to this point, both radical and conservative groups have similar experiences: they experience division as oppression, and they begin to seek new identification. However, the argumentative strategies they begin to employ are different.

Scott outlines the strategies of the radical groups as follows: they

1. Identify minorities as oppressed people, seeking to quicken feelings of oppression and to lay the ground for cooperation.
2. Place the blame for oppression on systems of domination such as racism and sexism.
3. Reverse the order of privilege as a symbolic embodiment of a reversed power relationship.[6]

In other words, the radical group desires division--but a division which it dominates. It retreats to conservative rhetoric in order to point out hypocrisy and to achieve power to overthrow the system.

The conservative group, on the other hand, desires identification. It retreats to radical rhetoric to gain functional power to be a part of the system.

A sence of consubstantiality or identification for all parties is essential if negotiation is to occur. There must be some sence of dependence--some recognition of the power wielded by the opponent. For A to accomplish its goal, B must fulfill some role or supply some resource. (An employer depends on employees to manufacture the product.) For B to accomplish its goal, A must fulfill some role or supply some resource. (An employee depends on the employer to keep the business running.) A recognition of power parity is essential.

The emerging group experiencing division must make the existing structure aware of its dependence on the emerging group (in other words, of the functional power of the emerging group). Only at that point will the existing group, blessed with legitimized power, be willing to negotiate. Negotiation occurs between equals, not between superiors and subordinates.

To force the recognition of power, the emerging group uses radical rhetoric to accomplish the following:

1. Make division obvious

The emerging group needs to build support and, through numbers, a power base. Radical rhetoric acts as a consciousness raising device. If people can be made aware of the hypocrisy of the existing structure and the resulting division they suffer, they are likely to support the group seeking to correct that situation. The greater the support, the greater the impact of the group in terms of needed resources, media coverage, and decision-making leverage.

The existing structure also must be made conscious of division. As long as it assumes the emerging group is subsumed within its own structure, it will not perceive the necessity for negotiation. The more different the emerging group appears (i.e., the more radical its rhetoric), the more a claim of consubstantiality appears ridiculous.[7]

2. Limit choices of the existing structure

Radical rhetoric becomes coercive to the extent that it forces the existing structure to comply with the wishes of the emerging group. The primary goal in limiting choices is a recognition of functional power and of common interests spanning the division now made obvious. With that recognition, negotiation is possible over more issue specific goals.

3. Become an influential part of the decision-making structure

This is the final identification sought. Once power parity is recognized, the existing structure can no longer ignore the emerging group.

In order to show the use of radical rhetoric by a conservative group needing to achieve functional power in negotiation, I will briefly review the history of one community action group, the Organization of the Northeast (ONE), and describe the Edgewater/ Uptown area of Chicago in which it is located. I will then examine two of the first campaigns developed by ONE. I will ask the following questions:

1. What strategies were used to make division obvious?
2. How was a perception of functional power developed?
3. How successful were these strategies at limiting the choices of the existing structure?
4. Did its strategies help the emerging group become a part of the decision-making structure?

Description of the Community

Chicago's Uptown community is one of the world's most unusual neighborhoods. It is the largest of Chicago's 76 communities with a population of more than 136,000 people. Uptown is widely known as a heterogeneous community, both ethnically and economically. In the local high school, for instance, there are students from 58 foreign countries. Uptown has been a residential community since its origin in the 1890's. At the turn of the century, Uptown residents were among Chicago's most affluent citizens.

During World War II, however, the community began to undergo transition. During the 1960's it became a port-of-entry for Applachian whites migrating to Chicago. By the mid-60's, Applachians were arriving in Uptown at a rate of 3,000 per month. Native American Indians also found their way to Uptown, most coming from other urban areas, but some straight from reservations. For years there has been a large Oriental population, especially of Japanese lineage. And since Uptown's beginning, there has been a small Black population. In the 1970's Latinos began to move into the community and are now its largest single minority group.

Uptown is a problem community. While inter-racial and inter-ethnic conflicts erupt in violence far less than one might imagine, Uptown has been labeled as "the toughest neighborhood in America."[8] Uptown has the largest number of senior citizens of any community area in Chicago. It also has the highest percentage of residents who are former mental patients.

While a considerable number of persons in the area are indeed lower income, significant numbers of middle and upper income families live along the lakefront and in the western portion of the community. The eastern part of the neighborhood is a corridor of high-rise apartment buildings of the luxury and semi-luxury type. The occupants of these buildings for the most part seek and find their communities outside the neighborhood where their residences are located. The economic and human resources of this group are consequently not available to Uptown and Edgewater.

As the area has undergone transition and government programs have uprooted the lower-income population in the southern portion of the community by tearing down buildings and creating vacant lots, private investors, both large and small, have moved in to take advantage of the situation. The social and physical problems in the southern portion of the community have increasingly shifted northward into the part of the community known as Edgewater, and northwestward into the portion known as Andersonville. It now appears that unless current trends are dealt with by the institutions of the community, vast numbers of persons of all economic groups will continue to drift, draining the community and placing little if any economic and human investment in the community.

Uptown Special Projects was created to intervene in this situation and to develop power instruments and social structures to be used by this community in fighting to maintain its heterogeneity and to create a healthy and genuine community in the midst of organizational rivalry, fragmentation, economic and social chaos which have been existent in the area.

History of ONE

The Organization of the Northeast (ONE) traces its beginnings to a decision in 1971 by the Hull House Association Uptown Center to make a major investment of its resources through Uptown Special Projects in the area of community development. A study of Uptown's needs by the Jane Addams School of Social Work persuaded the Center to enter into a cooperative venture with a professional free lance community organizer. In February, 1972, the Center began an in-depth study of leaders, organizations, and issues in the Uptown area. This study resulted in the formation of a small core group of leaders from both Uptown and Edgewater to begin developing a major organizing campaign. In June, 1972, the core group received a $15,000 grant from the Wieboldt Foundation for this purpose.

The first phase of the organizing campaign was intended to be low-profile and aimed at servicing existing community groups where possible and at forming coalitions of groups where practicable. Twenty new groups representing new constituencies were formed. The low profile stance was rigorously maintained to facilitate indigenous leadership development. The goal was to create a climate of action and change in the Uptown and Edgewater communities.

As a result of the relationships the core group developed with other community leaders, representatives of more than forty community groups and organizations in Uptown and Edgewater met October 27, 1973, to identify major community issues of common concern and to adopt action programs and structures to deal with those issues. They named themselves the Organization of the Northeast (ONE) and stated their primary goals:

"ONE is committed to maintaining the diverse ethnic and economic nature of the Uptown and Edgewater communities, to effectively promoting the dignity

of all their people, and to community determination of solutions to problems."[9]

The second, high profile phase of the organizing campaign was aimed at demonstrating that concerted action could result in significant community change. ONE began action on designated community problems at once.

Since ONE is actually an organization of organizations, the major thrust of program development is made by groups called ACTIONs. The ACTIONs are coordinated by ONE's staff, and personnel are recruited through member organizations of ONE.

Analysis of Campaigns

ONE has now established a certain reputation in the Uptown/Edgewater communities. Certain perceptions of its level of power and certain expectations about its argumentative stance are established. It is fitting, then, that we examine some of its earliest ACTIONS, those which have cumulatively influenced the perceptions of ONE's power.

Two of the earliest campaigns were closely connected and were developed by the Community Economics ACTION.

Junior College ACTION

When ONE was founded, the leaders concerned about the economy of the community established the following principle as the basis for action: money coming into the community should be made to stay in it as long as possible and to change hands within the community as many times as possible. Research indicated that gross neighborhood income was over one-half billion dollars a year. There were indications that the impact of these dollars was not being felt in the community. There was major disinvestment of the community. As the leaders sought to develop an issue to begin a process of re-investment, a group of Latino contractors demanded help with a problem they were having

in obtaining contracts on government financed construction in the community. Their immediate objective was to obtain work as contractors in the imminent construction of the $16.7 million dollar junior college facility in Uptown.

In November, 1973, the ONE Community Economics ACTION stopped the bid openings on construction for the college, and forced the Illinois Capital Development Board to convene a pre-bid conference for interested contractors to work out relationships and contracts among themselves and with contractors from the community. The local contractors, most of them Latinos, had been left out of the bidding process up to the point at which ONE intervened. As a result of efforts by ONE and the Latino contractors (who followed up the action by submitting their own bids to the major contractors and negotiating sub-contracts), local contractors were able to obtain $1.5 million in contracts on the construction of the college.

Question 1: What strategies were used to make division obvious?

For six years, leaders in the Edgewater/Uptown area worked to get a junior college in their community. Even through a series of discouraging delays, there seemed to be general agreement that the college would be important to the community. The basic assumption that brought apparent unity (consubstantiality) on the issue was that the junior college would bring practical education to poor people[10] and help relieve the poverty of the area.[11]

ONE began to point out division by challenging this assumption. It argued that only token interest was being paid to the needs of the community. The college was to cost $16 million. Some of that money could be channeled directly into the community if the Latino community contractors and sub-contractors were given the opportunity to bid on the job. They did not have the opportunity, however, because federal guidelines concerning minority participation did not apply to the state and locally funded junior college.

The first effort to point up the difference of opinion about how the college could benefit the community came in a meeting with Oscar Shabat, chancellor of the City Colleges of Chicago, on October 21, 1973. At that time, the primary question posed was "will employment and contract opportunities be available to people in our area, particularly Latino contractors?"[12] Shabat said he opposed any delay in opening bids because he feared delays would mean increased costs, but he did say he would support minority involvement and would help work out arrangements for a pre-bid conference if the Capital Development Board agreed to delay the bid deadline of November 7. Later Shabat qualified this support, "Here we are with the bids practically ready to open and construction to begin, and these people come in only 10 days ago and say they want a piece of the action."[13]

ONE wrote Illinois governor Daniel Walker asking him to direct the Capital Development Board to delay the bids in order to set up a pre-bid conference to work out joint ventures between Latino contractors and more experienced contractors.

On November 4, the group made its most visible demonstration of dissatisfaction. At a rally on the junior college building site, ONE staged a mock burial of discriminatory policies on the letting of contracts and made a strong plea for bringing some of the $16 million into the community through Latino involvement in joint venture contracts. There was a mock funeral and then all present participated in burying a large box identified as discriminatory policies by the Capital Development Board. The demonstration was given complete coverage on Channel 2 (CBS) news that night. The prediction of the news commentator was that there would be no delay.[14]

After this graphic presentation, the group met with the Capital Development Board November 6, the day before the scheduled deadline. Again it argued

that the people in the community should have the opportunity to build the college. The community contractors were small and inexperienced. Without an atmosphere encouraging joint ventures with larger contractors, the "minority contractor has no chance in hell"[15] of getting a bid. The Capital Development Board explained that it could guarantee no bids or joint ventures. It could not tell firms what to do, and it would not allow any Latino groups to participate if they were not qualified.

Later November 6, the Capital Development Board announced that the bid opening was delayed and a pre-bid conference would be set up.

Within two and one-half weeks, then, ONE was able to demonstrate that there was not consubstantiality about the building of the junior college. As the City Colleges of Chicago and the state Capital Development Board proceeded on the assumption that they were doing what the community wanted, ONE dramatized its feeling of oppression and pointed out that the community was being left out of the building process on the college. In the face of opposition, ONE argued for a delay on the college rather than accept what it saw as hypocrisy among the groups seeking to avoid delay.

Question 2: How was a perception of functional power developed?

ONE's strategies for demonstrating a sense of division included conservative rhetoric in its discussions with Shabat and the Capital Development Board. But its use of more radical rhetoric altered the perception of its functional power.

ONE was, after all, a brand new organization. It had no inherent power, but it was able to achieve functional power through its rhetoric. First, the college site demonstration made ONE visible to the community at large. In the demonstration, ONE was able to play on two highly volatile issues: race and money. Whether or not there was much response to that demonstration from

the community, the spectres of racial discrimination and economic injustice were fearsome enough to the governmental structures involved that ONE was given a good hearing and its demands were met.

Question 3: How successful were the strategies at limiting the choices of the existing structure?

When ONE first approached Shabat on October 21, it structured a choice where none had existed before. It proposed delaying the bid deadline to facilitate minority participation. Until the proposition, the option was non-existent.

The initial response to ONE's preferred choice was negative. Shabat indicated his fear that delay would result in increased costs. The Capital Development Board through Donald LeFevre, executive director, consistently reminded ONE that the Latin contractors had to be legally qualified to bid. "By law I cannot force a company which has bid to go into joint ventureship with anyone and by law we cannot allow any Latin groups to participate in a bid if they're not qualified."[16] LeFevre later said he would urge joint ventures, but that he could not give preference to such combinations.[17]

Even after the initial decision to delay the deadline, there was pressure to halt the delay. The Uptown Chicago Commission, another community group, accused Governor Walker and Shabat of cheating the people in the area of opportunities for education by allowing the delay sought by ONE.[18]

ONE chairpersons Kelly Sander and Ken Miller responded to these arguments by saying they also opposed delaying college construction, but they were unwavering in their insistence that there be minority involvement in the project.[19]

Initially, ONE was primarily concerned that the community profit economically from the building of the college. Its emphasis became one of fighting

racially discriminatory policies because the contractors in the Uptown/ Edgewater area were predominately Latino. That shift in emphasis was significant in obtaining the delay when information came to light that the state had not advertised for bids in Spanish language periodicals.[20] A charge of racism was more harmful than the threat of increased costs, so the delay was granted.

In essence, then, ONE provided a choice where one had not existed before. It was not able to weight the options in any concrete way, but its own visibility convinced state officials that a choice not to delay the deadline would carry a high cost in the form of racial discrimination charges. The possible costs of delay seemed less significant.

Question 4: Did its strategies help the emerging group become a part of the decision-making structure?

At the end of the first campaign by ONE, it was difficult to tell what impact it had on ONE's role in decision-making for the community. The Progressive Builders' Association (made up of the Latino contractors) became supportive of ONE's role in the community. The member organizations of ONE were heartened by the success (eleven minority contractors won bids), but there was no specific evidence that ONE had won a permanent place in the decision-making structure.

In fact, though ONE could count itself successful on this campaign, it was still having to cope with division within the community about its role. Specifically, the Uptown Chicago Commission had been angered because it thought ONE was trying to destroy its goal of many years to have an area college. Another indication that ONE had not achieved a permanent role was its failure during the next year to have a significant voice in naming the president of the junior college.

Nonetheless, ONE had surfaced in the community. It successfully pointed out the community's lack of voice in this one aspect of its future, and it achieved enough functional power to structure the reward/cost outcome of the decision-making process.

Banking Action

The effort to obtain money for the sub-contracts awarded on the junior college led to the second economic action by ONE.

After the pre-bid conference discussed above, one of the local contractors arranged a joint venture with a Latino contractor, and they received a sub-contract for $563,000. They needed a loan for initial salaries. ONE referred them to local financial institutions. When one of these institutions failed to make the loan or otherwise assist the local contractors, ONE developed a program to force local financial institutions to be more responsive to the community's needs. After unsuccessful efforts to negotiate with the largest bank in the community, ONE accused the institution of gross disinvestment of the community and had its records subpoenaed by the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, then conducting a study of "redlining." Finally, ONE conducted a protest demonstration--designed to attract maximum media coverage--in front of the bank. After these events, ONE found other local institutions anxious to develop meaningful dialogue and negotiations. Through this dialogue ONE was able to expand the development of its program for reinvestment of the ONE community.

By December, 1974, the American Banker reported in front page articles that ONE and five local financial institutions had signed national precedent-setting agreements. The agreements called for positive reciprocal support between the financial institutions and the residents, businesses, and other institutions in the community. The net dollar worth in increased credit for

the neighborhood was established at $11 million for 1975.

Question 1: What strategies were used to make division obvious?

The first indications that ONE differed in philosophy from the largest bank in the area came through relatively traditional means. The governor held an "accountability" session in Norridge on March 12, 1974, at which ONE representatives asked him to use his authority to secure deposits of state funds earmarked for projects in Uptown/Edgewater in banks in that area. An example of such funds would be the $16 million to be spent on the junior college. In return for such deposits, the banks would agree to expand their services to the community. At this session, Paul Moreno, president of the Progressive Builders' Association and co-chairperson of the Community Economic Action group criticized banks in the community. "The local banks are not responsive to our financial needs. We constantly are forced to go out of our neighborhoods to seek financial help, in many cases with interest rates much higher than we would like to have or can really afford. We are also forced to let jobs go by because we can't meet the monies necessary to carry them through."[21]

An actual sense of division became evident at a March 21 meeting between representatives of ONE and officials of the Uptown National Bank. ONE's primary purpose was to verify information concerning the percentage of loan money committed to the Uptown/Edgewater communities. ONE perceived its presentation as "low-key and reasonable."[22] Charles Goodrich, executive vice president of Uptown National, did not agree. He said no advance warning had been given of the meeting, that eleven persons showed up to present a list of demands, and that he was not aware the meeting was being vidio-taped until after initial statements had been made. He did admit that ONE's demands--full disclosure of lending information, increased loans in the community if

ONE brought new deposits to the bank, an urban development division, and financial counselling services--"probably have some validity."[23] ONE asked for a response by April 8. Bank officials said their board of directors was to meet April 16 and that they would not respond until after that meeting.

At that time, ONE had pointed out a possible division between the bank and ONE's constituency, ONE had operated with conservative rhetoric and continued to do so as it waited for a response from Uptown National Bank. On March 23, a seminar on banking was held. At the end of the month, ONE met with the Urban-Suburban Investment Study Group. Though these actions were potentially threatening, they did little more than illuminate the difference in goals held by ONE and UNB.

By April 24, however, ONE had still not received a response from UNB. At this point the rhetoric changed from conservative to radical. UNB began to be cast specifically as the enemy--the focus of the Economic Action. ONE charged UNB with redlining and asked the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission to subpoena bank records. Moreno said, "They keep ignoring us. We do feel we have the right to make them answer us, even if they say no."[24] He said he could personally testify to examples of redlining by UNB. The bank would say only that a response was forthcoming.

By this time, ONE had begun to widen the sense of division as well as to deepen it. It sought further community support for its side of the issue. It received an endorsement from the Edgewater Community Council on the banking issue, and on May 4, it participated in a Flea Market at a local church. There, ONE set up a booth called the "Uptown Irrational Bank." Visitors to the booth were urged to make a loan application. The application form asked for the following information:

"address, ethnic origin, race, purpose for loan (it does not matter), and

amount requested (any amount at all)."[25] The applications were returned with a red circle drawn on them and the explanation that the applicant was being redlined. The back of the form read, "If you live in this community and have applied for a loan from a local financial institution, you probably have had the kind of experience a lot of residents of this community have: 'loan request denied. if (sic) so, See ONE. ONE WINS"[26]

At the ONE section of the booth, the new "Community Building Through Community Banking" program was explained and visitors were given pledge cards reading as follows:

> Yes, count on me to help in ONE's community building program. I will do the following:
> 1. place my checking and/or savings accounts in a bank which cooperates with the ONE program (I now have accounts at the following banks:_____)
> 2. circulate the pledge to friends and neighbors
> 3. work in the office to prepare mailings, etc.
> 4. participate in meetings and activities of the ONE Community Economics ACTION[27]

During the next week, UNB also attempted to solicit support by running an advertisement entitled "Our Involvement in Uptown" in the Lerner newspapers for that area. The ad read in part:

> Uptown as a heterogeneous community may be the prototype or model of the kind of community which can save Chicago's inner city. Regardless of the apparent deterioration which may be about us, we of the Bank have such great confidence in the area that we recently purchased our banking facilities and are no longer just tenants.
> Within current memory, Uptown National Bank has never knowingly, or intentionally discriminated against any person in the carrying on of its banking functions. The Bank makes loans in the Uptown area and will continue to do so as long as the financial/responsibility of the borrower, whether individual or business, meets sound banking practices. The Bank does not maintain separate criteria in deciding upon the desirability of any loan relating to any racial, ethnic, or location considerations.[28]

ONE responded: "The people ONE has been speaking with in numerous community meetings want the facts and figures on Uptown National's role in

the community, and they are not easily convinced by a philosophical statement such as found in your ad."[29] ONE also asked that the bank purchase additional advertising space to answer specific questions arising from the bank's statement.

The most dramatic illustration of division occurred when ONE staged a demonstration in front of the bank May 25, setting up a 1930's soup line to protest the bank's "depression era mentality."[30] The demonstrators dressed as hobos and dished out pea soup "to illustrate the depression psychology that exists among banks and savings and loan associations" and contributes to neighborhood decay because of their lending policies.[31] Passers-by were able to listen to recordings of Franklin Roosevelt's fireside chats and to songs by the demonstrators. The approximately 150 people carried signs with slogans such as "Uptown needs a New Deal," "Keep our money in the community," "Roosevelt declares a bank holiday," and "Hey, UNB--Can you lend us a dime?" On a flatbed truck, ONE members costumed as Farmer and Mrs. MacDonald received burlap bags of money to dramatize the amount of money UNB was lending to rural areas. Apples were passed out along with information sheets on the amount of money UNB was lending in the community as compared with the amount being lent outside the community.

Bank officials refused to meet with the protestors or issue a formal statement.

Question 2: How was a perception of functional power developed?

Throughout this campaign, ONE made directed efforts to positively influence perceptions of its power. For community banks to be willing to negotiate with ONE, it was crucial that they perceive ONE as powerful enough either to bring in additional monies in deposits or to influence current bank customers to withdraw money. ONE's first step was to enlist the aid of

the governor. It then rhetorically structured its visit to UNB in such a way as to put the bank at a disadvantage. (ONE members arrived without notice and in sufficient numbers to be overpowering. They called their requests "demands," they set a deadline for a response, and they videotaped the meeting.)[32]

ONE's functional power was augmented when it instigated an investigation of UNB by the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission. ONE further widened its base of support by appeals to other community groups. New identifications were being formed within the community. Residents were beginning to indicate they wanted positive demonstrations of a bank's commitment to the community; they were refusing to support hypocritical institutions. Because of ONE's focus on UNB, UNB was beginning to be defined as a hypocritical institution.

The rhetoric of the mass media further increased ONE's image of functional power. There was television coverage of the Depression demonstration, but even more potentially harmful to UNB was national coverage of the demonstration by the American Banker, billed as "The Only Daily Banking Newspaper." In a front page story, the American Banker gave full accounts of ONE's charges. The bank continued to decline to issue a formal statement.

Question 3: How successful were these strategies at limiting the choices of the existing structure?

Through the entire bank ACTION, ONE set up clearly delineated choices. In the March 21 meeting with bank officials, ONE asked for full disclosure of lending information, increased loans in the community if ONE brought new deposits to the bank, an urban development division, and financial counselling services for individuals and small businesses--and it asked for a response of these matters by April 8. If the bank agreed to fulfill the demands, ONE

pledged to bring additional deposits to the bank from both state funds and area depositors. The other side of the choice was unspoken but clearly implied. If the bank did not comply with the demands, ONE would seek to prevent it from receiving new deposits from the state and from area depositors.

Bank officials chose not to answer ONE's demands. It may have been that the bank did not see ONE as functionally powerful. It may have been that they feared greater harm through disclosure than through ONE's campaign to prevent them from receiving new monies. Regardless, ONE's response was to follow up on its implied threat. ONE accused the bank of redlining and asked the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission to subpoena the bank's records. In the minds of ONE's personnel, the bank had had the choice of opening its records by itself or by force.

ONE then instituted the second phase of its response. Its campaign, Community Building Through Community Banking, was an effort to persuade depositors to move their banking business away from UNB and to those institutions willing to fulf'll ONE's demands.

ONE had to support its sense of functional power by seeing to it that UNB had to pay for not meeting ONE's demands. But ONE still wanted the bank to come around to ONE's way of thinking. The Depression demonstration was an effort to force a response from the bank. It did not work. Publicity attended the reciprocal agreements signed by ONE and five other financial institutions in the area. This might have brought pressure on UNB to also sign the agreement. The bank still has not joined in that agreeme n t.

The choices presented to UNB were clear. The bank chose to pay the cost of not agreeing to ONE's demands.

Question 4: Did its strategies help the emerging group become a part of the decision-making structure?

Through this Economic ACTION, ONE did begin to make a place for itself within the decision-making structure. The most graphic indication, of course, is the reciprocal agreement ONE established with five financial institutions. They were willing to be influenced by ONE and to tie themselves to ONE at least for a period of time. (The reciprocal agreement is still in effect as of 1977 and is in the process of being updated for signing in early 1978.)

The American Banker, a prestigious part of the financial community's structure, recognized ONE as a force to be reckoned with in its prominent coverage of the demonstration and of the signing of the reciprocal agreement. Shortly after its recognition, representatives of ONE were asked to attend a City Council meeting to confer with the finance committee. Furthermore, the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee asked for ONE to send someone to testify concerning the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 requiring that mortgage bankers and savings and loans disclose where they lend their money. Speakers for the American Bankers Association and the U.S. League of Savings Associations expressed alarm about community groups forcing financing in high risk neighborhoods. Senator Proxmire, a sponsor of the bill, was able to quote Robert Thrasher of ONE that red lining becomes a self fulfilling prophecy[33] but that under the reciprocal agreement in Uptown/Edgewater, the volume of mortgages increased by $13 million a year. There was no testimony that financial institutions disclosing information had suffered loss at the hands of community groups using that information. The bill passed the Senate.

In addition, ONE was asked to testify before the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, The Real Estate Commission of the State Department of Registration and Education, and concerning the Chicago City Council

Ordinance on Disclosure and Anti-Redlining by Depositaries of Municipal Funds, branch banking in Illinois, and the Community Development Act.

ONE's activity in the area of community economics has established the group at the local, state and federal levels as knowlegeable, powerful and a factor in the decision-making process.

The nature of the goals desired by conservative groups in society poses special problems frequently overlooked or unnoticed. Such goals are those held by society in general and therefore assumed to be in process. Emerging conservative groups--seeking to preserve and achieve these goals--want to point out instances in which the goals have been forgotten. It seems a minor instance of division, but because the larger system continues to assume consubstantiality and to assume progress toward the goals, the sense of division experienced by the emerging group grows. In the Junior College instance, "everybody" wanted the junior college and "everybody" knew it would help the community economically. ONE agreed, but it saw hypocrisy in the lack of effort to expand the economic impact of the construction of the junior college--to push harder in the present toward achieving the goal people were expecting to achieve sometime in the future. In the banking issue, "everybody" agreed that banks were important in the economic health of a community. But ONE saw the role of financial institutions as hypocritical. They could do more for the community--and beyond that, the community itself could help them do so.

Conservative goals are not easily recognized as different from those of the existing structure. The emerging group has to make them noticeable. In other words, the emerging group has to point out to the established structure and to citizens in the community that division exists. The emerging group has to refuse to be subsumed within the larger structure.

Once division is recognized, the emerging group must influence the course of events in an effort to achieve its goals. It structures the choices available to the established group. It seeks to reward the "correct" choice and to extract a cost for the "wrong" choice.

The ultimate goal for the emerging group is to be considered a significant part of the decision-making structure. It desires an actual voice rather than a representative one. It wants its opinions considered and not taken for granted. It seeks identification based on respect and not assumption.

Radical rhetoric is the vehicle for conservative groups to achieve the functional power to:

1. make division obvious, 2. limit the choices of the existing decision-making structure, and 3. become an influential part of the decision-making structure.

Footnotes

[1]"The Conservative Voice in Radical Rhetoric: A Common Response to Division," Speech Monographs, 40 (1973), 124-125.

[2]"Measurements of Social Power, Opportunity Cost, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games," Behavioral Science, 7 (1962), 70.

[3]with apologies to Robert Scott.

[4]Scott, 123-124.

[5]See, for instance, Kenneth E. Boulding, "Towards a Theory of Protest," in The Age of Protest, ed. Walt Anderson (Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1969); John W. Bowers and Donovan J. Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1971); James Chesebro, "Rhetorical Strategies of the Radical Revolutionary, Today's Speech, 20 (winter 1972); James W. Chesebro, John F. Cragan and Patricia McCullough, "The Small Group Technique of the Radical Revolutionary: A Synthetic Study of Consciousness Raising," Speech Monographs 40 (June 1973); Herbert Simons, "Persuasion in Social Conflict: A Critique of Prevailing Conception and Framawork for Future Research," Speech Monographs 34 (November 1972).

[6]Scott, 131.

[7]Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (University of Berkeley and Los Angeles: California Press, 1969), pp. 55-59.

Burke argues that persuasion requires identification between parties. I am arguing that identification can blind parties to separate identies. A group may see one of its constituents as so subsumed within itself that it may not recognize separate needs or goals held by that constituent. Unless a group is recognized as a legitmate separate entity, it can hardly negotiate to achieve its interests. Therefore, a sense of division is a prerequisite of persuasion. Use of techniques of identification are then needed in the persuasion process.

[8]"The ONE Story," part of a proposal presented to the Wieboldt Foundation, May, 1976.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Richard Bjorklund, "Stumbling Bureaucracy Stalls Building of College in Uptown," Lerner Newspaper, Uptown News, January 29, 1974.

[11]Communication for Change, "Junior College Action," Video tape of meeting with Oscar Shabat, October 21, 1973.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Carolyn Toll, "Coalition Asks Delay on College Bids," Chicago Sun-Times, November 6, 1973, p. 16.

[14]Communication for Change, "College Site Action," Video Tape of Television newscast on Channel 2, WBBM, November 4, 1973.

[15]Communication for Change, ONE Community Economic Action," Video tape of meeting with the Capital Development Board, November 6, 1973.

[16]Toll, p. 16.

[17]"Uptown College Bid Action Jan. 8," Chicago Sun-Times, November 15, 1973, p. 42.

[18]Lesley Sussman, "Uptown Group Criticizes Delay in College Constructions," Lerner Newspapers, sec. 1, p. 5.

[19]Ibid.

[20]"Uptown College Bid Action," p. 42.

[21]Jerry Kohler, ONE Asks Walker for Help," Uptown News, March 19, 1974.

[22]Kohler, "Grothaus: Red- Lining Exports Bank's Capital," Rogers Park/Edgewater News, April 2, 1974, sec. 2, p. 1.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Kohler, "ONE Charges Bank Red-Lining," The Sunday Star, April 28, 1974, sec. 1. p. 1.

[25]Loan Application form, material obtained from ONE.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Pledge Card, material obtained from ONE.

[28]Uptown National Bank of Chicago, "Our Involvement in Uptown," Uptown News, May 2, 1974.

[29]Kohler, "Bank Ad Riles ONE," Lerner Newspapers, Week of May 14, 1974.

[30]James Rubenstein, "Action Group States 'Soup-Line' Red-Lining Protest at Chi. Bank," American Banker, May 29, 1974, p. 3.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Tedwilliam Theodore of Communications for Change, the organization which does the video taping, which he calls "social and political intervention." He utilizes the video taping process deliberately to change the dynamics of group interaction.

[33]Tom Littlewood, "Home-Loan Chief Sees Redline Data Folding S&Ls," Chicago Sun-Times, May 8, 1975, p. 6.